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s mobile devices and location systems
such as the Global Positioning System
(GPS) and phone-based technologies
proliferate, so too does interest in
location-based applications. These
applications include tourist information systems,
buddy services that inform users when a friend is
nearby, and location-based adver-
tisements, which marketers send
to users on the basis of their cur-
rent locations. Such applications
raise serious privacy issues that
developers must address, both to
appease public concern and to
comply with current legislation. 
An important first step in pro-
tecting users’ location privacy is
notifying them of requests for this information. For
example, a system might ask users to authorize
release of their location information by clicking
“OK” on a dialog box for each new request. Such a
system would be at odds with Mark Weiser’s vision
of calm technology, however.1Weiser argues that for
technology to become truly ubiquitous, it should
merge into the background such that it becomes a
part of the fabric of everyday life. Thus the goal is to
minimize technology’s intrusiveness and its demands
of users. In this article, we address these two con-
flicting requirements of location-based systems—the
need for users to control their location privacy and
the need to minimize the demands made of users.
Our system was motivated by an extremely prac-
tical problem—that is, how to protect location infor-
mation gathered by our groups’ location-tracking
systems. We created LocServ2 to support the vari-
ous location-based applications developed in our
laboratories. LocServ is a middleware service that
lies between location-based applications and loca-
tion-tracking technologies. By unifying location-
tracking technologies, LocServ lets location-based
applications use multiple positioning systems. In
essence, LocServ users can specify a location query
using any of the symbolic or geometric location
models that LocServ understands, and the service
can resolve the queries using any number of under-
lying technologies. Thus, LocServ allows applica-
tions to be written in a way that is entirely inde-
pendent of the underlying location technology that
they use. Such a service requires mechanisms for
controlling access to users’ location information
without repeated user intervention. We have thus
developed an extensible system that gives users fine-
grained control over the release of their location
information. More specifically, we offer a general
framework of components that lets users apply gen-
eral policies to control distribution of their infor-
mation. We use factors such as the type of organi-
zation or application requesting the data together
The increase in location-based applications makes protecting personal
location information a major challenge. Addressing this challenge
requires a mechanism that lets users automate control of their location
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bution policies and, crucially, a mechanism
for consulting external entities such as
application-specific modules before releas-
ing information. 
Like the World Wide Web Consortium’s
Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) and
Marc Langheinrich’s Privacy Awareness
System (pawS), our system uses machine-
readable privacy policies and user prefer-
ences to automate the privacy management
decision-making process. As the sidebar,
“Related Work on Privacy in Location-
Based Systems” explains, however, our sys-
tem architecture and preference language
are significantly different from those in P3P
and pawS, reflecting the differences in
deployment domain. 
General requirements
The following scenario illustrates the
requirements for a privacy policy system
for location-based applications.
A health-care worker, Sally, carries
a mobile phone that lets her employer
locate her whenever she has the device.
During the day, Sally visits patients
in their homes and is pleased that her
company can locate her with an accu-
racy of about 100 meters. Her com-
pany uses this information to inform
patients of her likely arrival times
and to maintain her schedule without
her having to disclose her movements
within houses.
When she is off-duty, Sally does
not want the company to track her.
If she must wait for a table at a
restaurant, however, she wants the
restaurant to know her location so
that they can find her when her table
is ready. Of course once she leaves
the restaurant, she does not want the
owners to be able to determine her
location. Similarly, when Sally uses
her mobile phone to call a cab at the
end of the evening, she wants the
taxi company to determine her loca-
tion automatically to ensure a smooth
pickup, but she does not want them
to be able to trace her once the jour-
ney is over. 
Sally is also planning a vacation,
and when she visits, for example, the
FunTime amusement park, she will
let the park management track her
for safety and management purposes,
but she does not want this informa-
tion correlated with her identity. 
Finally, Sally uses a small set of
location-based applications, includ-
ing a general information service
that warns her of traffic holdups in
her area and a find-a-friend service
that tells her when she is within half
a mile of one of her friends. Indepen-
dent companies provide these services,
and Sally wants to disclose only the
minimum amount of information
necessary for them to provide the
required functionality. 
This scenario also illustrates the richness
of constraints (or preferences) users might
want to apply to control the distribution of
their location information. In our example,
Sally restricts access to her information in
several ways:
• Organization.In most cases, Sally restricts
access to her location information to spe-
cific organizations (such as her employer
or the find-a-friend service provider).
• Service. While Sally generally restricts
access to her location information to
known companies, she will also accept
certain types of information (informa-
tion bulletins, for example) from new
companies.
• Time. Sally controls her employer’s
access to her location information on the
basis of the time of day—she has differ-
ent policies for work days, weekends,
and evenings.
• Location. Sally will let the amusement
park management track her location
while she is in the park but not when she
leaves. Hence, their ability to obtain
location information depends on her
location and the relationship between
the company requesting the information
and the physical space. 
• Request type. Sally restricts the type of
query an application can issue to obtain
her location information. For example,
she provides an anonymized trace of her
location in the amusement park. Fur-
thermore, although Sally will tell the
find-a-friend service when she is within
a specified distance of one of her friends,
she does not want to tell them her exact
location.
• Context. Sally uses her calendar (or
work schedule) to control her employer’s
access to her location information.
Other forms of contextual information,
such as whether or not she is alone,
could easily form part of her preferences.
This is not an exhaustive set of require-
ments for privacy preferences in ubiqui-
tous computing environments. Indeed, a
user could easily add the constraint, “infor-
mation about my child’s location can only
be released when the child is with me or
my spouse.” At least two additional con-
straints exist: the need to comply with
existing and emerging legislation and, as
discussed previously, the desire to minimize
user interaction when dealing with requests
for location information.
Current legislation
Currently, two important pieces of pri-
vacy-related legislation exist: the US Pri-
vacy Act of 1974 and the European Union’s
Directive 95/46/EC.3 The US Privacy Act
of 1974 was designed for information pri-
vacy. It gives legal substance to the idea of
fair information practices including open-
ness and transparency (for example, no
secret record keeping), individual partici-
pation, collection and use limitations, rea-
sonable security, and accountability. 
The EU’s directive addresses the protec-
tion and movement of personal data. It
limits data transfer to non-EU countries to
those countries deemed to have an ade-
quate level of privacy protection. It also
requires explicit consent—that is, a user
must unambiguously consent to having
their information collected. Like Langhein-
rich, we recognize the difficulty of design-
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Our system uses machine-readable 
privacy policies and user preferences 
to automate the privacy management 
decision-making process.ing a system that guarantees compliance
with such laws and hence developed an
architecture based on trust and respect:
producers and consumers both state their
information collection and distribution
policies, and we assume these statements
are accurate. We rely on digital signatures
to prove the statements’ authenticity and
expect that legislation could be used to
hold users accountable for violating their
stated policies.
User interaction
We aimed to develop a system that
required minimal ongoing user involve-
ment. In particular, we did not want users
to have to repeatedly evaluate the accept-
ability of an application’s request for loca-
tion information. Instead, we wanted to
push a request’s acceptance or rejection to
the periphery and only bring a request to
users’ attention if they had not established
a policy to handle it. The potentially large
volume of requests each user could be sub-
jected to on any given day made this an
important design consideration. Moreover,
we believe user privacy should be protected
by default; thus, the system architecture lets
a user elect to share certain information
rather than protect specific information.
System architecture 
Figure 1 shows our system’s overall
architecture. We assume the existence of a
location server (such as LocServ) that
answers applications’ queries concerning
users’ locations. These queries can be
broadly classified into types:
• User location requests—requests for the
location of a specific user or users, iden-
tified by their unique identifiers.
• Enumeration requests—requests for lists
of users at specific locations, expressed
either in terms of geographic or symbolic
attributes.
• Asynchronous requests—requests for
“event” information, such as when users
enter or leave specific areas or when
proximity relationships are satisfied (for
example, tell me when Sally and Bob are
within half a mile of each other).
The location server abstracts over the
underlying positioning technologies used
to derive location, such as GPS and Active
Bat systems,4 and provides applications




espite its obvious importance, relatively little systems-oriented
research has addressed privacy protection in ubiquitous com-
puting systems. Several exceptions have informed our work.
Geopriv 
The Internet Engineering Task Force’s Geopriv working group
has identified a need to “securely gather and transfer location
information for location services, while at the same time protect-
ing the privacy of the individuals involved.”1 The November 2002
IETF draft describes one approach to securely transferring location
information and associated privacy data. In essence, the scheme
involves creating location objects that encapsulate user location
data and associated privacy requirements. Central to this scheme
is the notion that location objects can be made tamper resistant—
for example, by digitally signing them. The approach is similar to
digital rights management schemes designed to protect digital
media from illegal redistribution.
At present the Geopriv proposal and our scheme are largely
orthogonal. We focus on defining the management of information
release and the nature of the privacy rules and preferences used to
control this release, but Geopriv does not address these issues.
Hence, Geopriv could use a subset of our system’s rule sets and
overall policy architecture as the “privacy-enabling information”1
stored in a location object. Geopriv’s proposed coupling of data
and privacy metadata offers greater accountability than our system
when location information has been passed between multiple
applications. The practicality of such a system has yet to be deter-
mined, however.
P3P and Appel 
Together, P3P2 and Appel3 help Web sites announce their privacy
practices while letting users automate their accept and reject deci-
sions. P3P specifies an architecture comprising user agents, privacy
reference files, and privacy policies. When users access a Web site,
their user agents obtain a privacy reference file for the Web site
using one of several well-defined mechanisms. This file contains a list
of mappings between URIs for the site’s Web resources and URIs of
their associated privacy policies. The Web agent can thus ensure that
the system downloads, parses, and compares the appropriate privacy
policy with the user’s preferences prior to accessing a Web resource. 
P3P also specifies the language used to express privacy policies,
while privacy preferences used to configure user agents can be
expressed in several forms. P3P commonly uses Appel to ensure
that different user agents can reuse preferences. 
P3P does not attempt to enforce or ensure privacy through
technology—for example, by cryptographic or anonymization
techniques. Instead it relies on social and legal pressures to compel
organizations to comply with their stated policies.
pawS
pawS is a privacy awareness system for ubiquitous computing
environments.4 Like P3P, pawS aims to provide users with tools that
let them protect their personal privacy and help others respect that
privacy. It is based on respect and social and legal norms rather than
rigorous technical protection of private information. In pawS, when
a user enters an environment in which services are collecting data, a
privacy beacon announces the privacy policies of each service in the
Related Work on Privacy in Location-Based Systemsone or more location servers, registering
their privacy requirements with each server.
These requirements take the form of sys-
tem components called validators. Given
a request for location information and a
privacy policy provided by the application,
validators determine whether the requested
information can be released and, if so,
whether the location servershould impose
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environment. A user’s privacy proxy (similar to P3P’s user agents)
checks these policies, expressed in the same language as P3P policies,
against the user’s predefined privacy preferences, expressed in Appel.
If the policies agree, the services can collect information and users can
utilize the services. If the policies don’t agree, the system notifies the
user, who can choose not to use the service in question or, in extreme
cases, leave the area in which the information collection is occurring.
Systems analysis 
P3P and pawS are good starting points for investigations into
privacy-enabling schemes in ubiquitous computing, and significant
work has gone into making P3P comply with existing and emerg-
ing legislation in information protection and privacy. However,
neither system can adequately support the scenarios described in
the article. Because P3P is designed to support Web interactions
typically involving e-commerce and business applications, its
mechanisms for obtaining reference files and policy documents
are tightly coupled with Web usage models, protocols, and
deployment architectures. Moreover, the policy language, while
extensible, contains constructs for expressing information-collec-
tion and management policies appropriate for protecting informa-
tion disclosed during Web browsing and user-initiated online
transactions. Our system protects the user when arbitrary third-
party location-based applications require information from the
user’s location server. Similarly, while Appel provides a good start-
ing point for expressing privacy preferences, it cannot support the
richness of expression necessary for autonomous evaluation of user
criteria in real application domains.
Our system also differs from pawS, P3P, and Geopriv in its asso-
ciation between preferences, services, and data. Geopriv’s fairly
simple model for associating privacy requirements with user data
makes it difficult to capture privacy requirements that span multi-
ple data items or do not readily fit into location objects. For exam-
ple, in Geopriv it would be difficult to specify that an application
can know if two people are in the same general area but cannot
know their individual locations. 
Philosophically, our system is fundamentally different from
pawS. pawS lets users protect their privacy at the moment of
information capture, typically when they access a service or enter
a new geographic space. In contrast, our system attempts to pro-
vide privacy checks at the moment of information release—that is,
when an application makes a solicited or unsolicited request for
location information. 
REFERENCES
1. J. Cuellar, J.B. Morris Jr., and D. Mulligan, “Geopriv Requirements,”
Internet draft, Nov. 2002.
2. The Platform for Privacy Preferences 1.0 (P3P1.0) Specification, World
Wide Web Consortium, Sept. 2001, www.w3.org/TR/2001/WD-P3P-
20010928.
3.  A P3P Preference Exchange Language 1.0 (Appel 1.0), working draft, World
Wide Web Consortium, Apr. 2002, www.w3.org/TR/P3P-preferences.
4. M. Langheinrich, “A Privacy Awareness System for Ubiquitous Comput-












Privacy policies, preferences, 
and request data
Figure 1. Overall system architecture. 
The location server works on top of 
positioning technologies such as GPS,
receiving requests for users’ location
information from various applications.
System components called validators
determine whether or not to grant the
applications’ requests.any special constraints (such as reducing
the location data’s accuracy). Users regis-
ter a single validator with a location server
for each of their identifiers. Because val-
idators can call other validators for help
making decisions, however, multiple val-
idators might be used to determine the cor-
rect response in any given case. We assume
that trusted relationships exist between
users, their location-tracking systems, val-
idators, and the location server.
Applications wishing to obtain infor-
mation about a user’s location query the
location server, including with the query a
privacy policy statement. The location
server consults the relevant validators
before releasing any information. If neces-
sary, the location server can require appli-
cations to sign their privacy statements
and, similarly, applications can require the
location server to return a signed agree-
ment to these practices.
Both the location server and the valida-
tors are abstract entities that can be real-
ized as integrated components of a single
location technology or, as in our system,
as a self-contained middleware service with
associated internal and external validators
balancing efficiency with extensibility.
Thus the location server in our architec-
ture simply represents the point at which
validators check privacy statements from
client applications against users’ or system
administrators’ privacy preferences.
Expressing privacy policies
Third-party applications seeking a user’s
location first choose a location server
responsible for the user, typically deter-
mined by the contact details available to the
application (given a phone number, for
example, an application might contact the
location server of the user’s mobile tele-
phone provider). The application contacts
the location server and sends both a query
and a statement of its privacy policy. The
query should be in a format the location
server in question understands. In our sys-
tem, this is a proprietary LocServ format,
but applications could use other formats
such as that proposed by the Location Inter-
operability Forum (www.locationforum.
org) for other types of location servers.
To support automatic checking of pri-
vacy policies, developers must agree on a
common scheme for describing these poli-
cies. We use Appel, the policy specification
language proposed as part of the W3C’s
P3P specification (see the sidebar). This
XML-based language provides a machine-
readable form of the privacy policies cur-
rently found on manyWeb sites. It provides
a wide range of constructs allowing, for
example, Web sites to describe the infor-
mation types they will collect, who will
have access to this information, and how
long it will be retained.
To address the requirements of location-
based applications, we extended the P3P
policy specification language. These exten-
sions constitute the main differences
between privacy policies related to Web
browsing and e-commerce and those
related to location-based applications.
Entity. The P3P entity tag provides a mech-
anism for describing the business and con-
tact details of an organization providing
Web-based services. In our system, entities
represent arbitrary third-party applications
requesting location information. We have
augmented the entity tag with the fields type
and cert (optional). An organization type
can be nonprofit, profit, or government.
The tag lets the system automatically iden-
tify and filter course-grained application
classes (for example, it can place restric-
tions on all nonprofit services). The certfield
lets the system introduce certification
schemes (a user might wish to only use ser-
vices certified by a particular set of trusted
organizations or authorities).
Purpose. P3P’s purpose tag reflects its orien-
tation to e-commerce and Web interactions
(representing such intentions as telemar-
keting and Web page tailoring). We use a
new set of broad classifications to more
accurately reflect the intentions of location-
based service providers: safety, entertain-
ment, marketing, information, service deliv-
ery, statistical analysis, and security. Safety
services include danger warnings in partic-
ular geographic areas or emergency service
support, whereas security applications
track the user for security purposes (sur-
veillance, for example). Like P3P, our
schema allows for arbitrary user extensions.
Request-initiation. In P3P-based Web
interactions, the user always initiates a dia-
logue by visiting a particular Web site and
following certain hyperlinks. In our model
applications can request information from
the user’s location service at any time. We
added a new request initiation tag and parti-
tioned interactions into two classes: unso-
licited and solicited. Unsolicited interac-
tions are not explicitly or consciously
triggered by the user (for example, initi-
ated speculatively as a user wanders into a
particular region or proximity). We assume
solicited interactions have been explicitly
triggered by some out-of-band user-initi-
ated action (requesting a taxi to his or her
current location, for example). Arbitrary
user data (proof) might accompany a solicited
tag to link the request back to the instigat-
ing action. The request initiation tag also lets
the user block unwanted requests from
unsolicited services.
In contrast to P3P, our system does not
require policies to specify the data to be col-
lected, because the system can determine it
from the associated query. Because our pol-
icy language is simply a set of extensions to
the current P3P language, our system can
use existing P3P policy specifications. Such
policies are unlikely to be applicable, how-
ever, because they will typically specify data
items collected during Web-based activities
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In contrast to P3P, our system does not require
policies to specify the data to be collected
because the system can determine it from the
associated query.(and will thus be inappropriate for queries
issued to a location service). In addition,
they will not detail the application purpose
sufficiently to let most users determine
whether to accept or reject the request.
Validators and user preferences 
Validators check the acceptability of pri-
vacy policies and determine whether the
system should accept a request. As part of
this decision-making process, validators
can call other validators, creating networks
of components that collectively determine
whether information should be released to
the application. Potential validator com-
ponents include
• User confirmation. A simple validator
component could pass the responsibil-
ity for decision making to the user by
displaying a dialog box containing a
summary of the requesting application’s
privacy policy and information require-
ments. While such a validator does not
begin to address the desire for calm tech-
nology, it is a useful component at the
end of a chain of other validators when
the system has been unable to automat-
ically decide whether to accept a request.
• User data and context.We can construct
validators to base their decisions on data
from user applications such as calendars
or system components such as activity
monitors. More generally, validators let
the system include contextual informa-
tion in the decision-making process.
• External services.External validation ser-
vices can, for example, resolve issues of
ownership of a physical space, which
may be a factor in determining a request’s
acceptability. Other examples of exter-
nal services include verification of a third
party’s reputation and checking “spam
request” listings. 
A requirement for general-purpose val-
idators that can make decisions based on
information supplied in a request’s privacy
policy also exists. Users could tailor these
general-purpose validators using a range of
mechanisms including preference languages
such as Appel or more general-purpose rule-
based languages. Our experiments suggest
that a simple scheme that allows constraints
expressed in terms of the basic attributes
specifiable in privacy policies (entity, pur-
pose, and so on) provides sufficient flexi-
bility for expressing many common privacy
preferences. Additional features include
• Statement. The user can define a policy
statement for each request type sup-
ported by the location serverAPI, choos-
ing to accept the request uncondition-
ally or to impose certain time, location,
or accuracy constraints. For example, a
user might accept a request to enumer-
ate all users within a given locale (pro-
viding course-grained identification), but
might reject a direct request for his or
her precise location.
• Limit time. Users can associate time
bounds with preferences. For example,
users might impose a constraint such
that their employers can only access their
location during work hours.
• Limit location. Users can restrict collec-
tion of their information to specified
geographic areas. For example, users
might let a shopping mall track their
location while they are in the mall, but
would presumably want this surveil-
lance to stop when they leave.
• Validator.Users can specify one or more
URIs to external policy validators. Each
validator receives a copy of the third-
party request and the accompanying pri-
vacy policy statement. The validator can
implement any arbitrary policy on the
user’s behalf, returning accept or reject
responsesto the location server evaluat-
ing the policy. Currently, our system
allows validators to be combined using
simple logical operators.
• Quality of service.Our system incorpo-
rates a placeholder for specifying qual-
ity of service (QoS) in user preferences,
which can limit the accuracy or certainty
with which a user can be located.
Provisioning time and location con-
straints is particularly important in sup-
porting ongoing location operations that
yield events to a third party over time.
Users can register any component that pro-
vides an appropriate interface as a valida-
tor. Thus we do not expect just one val-
idator type or even one mechanism for
specifying preferences to general-purpose
validators. Hence, we are not concerned
with standardizing languages for express-
ing preferences, such as Appel. 
Anonymity 
Producing anonymous location informa-
tion is a nontrivial task, and several recent
research papers have attempted to address
this problem (see the related article, “Loca-
tion Privacy in Pervasive Computing,” in
this issue). Our current system relies on users
having multiple identifiers. More specifi-
cally, when the system receives a location
request that requires it to divulge a user’s
identity, the user’s validators are consulted
to determine whether to return the user’s
long-term identifier, a short-term identifier
associated with the user, or a new randomly
generated identifier. The system can create
the new identifiers with new validators and
associated rule sets, or the new identifiers
can inherit the user’s original configuration.
Say FunTime’s owners have registered
with Sally’s location service to receive an
event whenever someone enters the park.
Because Sally is willing to provide them with
that information, but not with her identity,
her validator sends FunTime a new identi-
fier in response to its query. Of course, Fun-
Time can reuse the identifier to obtain Sally’s
location during her visit, but the identifier
will eventually expire and will have no link
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Provisioning time and location constraints is
particularly important in supporting ongoing
location operations that yield events to a third
party over time. back to Sally’s long-term identifier.
Such a scheme does not, of course, pro-
vide complete anonymity because applica-
tions might be able to deduce the mapping
between temporary and permanent iden-
tifiers by observing movement patterns.
Protecting against this type of attack is out-
side the scope of this work.
The user’s role 
Validators automate the process of check-
ing privacy policies against user preferences,
whether or not these preferences are an inte-
gral part of the validator or passed to the
validator as a parameter in the form of a
configuration script, for example. Clearly
we do not expect end users to write their
own validator components or even produce
configuration scripts unaided. Instead, we
assume that service providers and other
trusted organizations will provide users with
default validators. For situations requiring
nonstandard preferences, simple tools could
help users create appropriate configurations.
To help clarify this process we created sev-
eral “wizards” that ask users a series of
questions about their location information
privacy preferences and then generate
appropriate configuration scripts.
Similarly, we would not expect individ-
ual application writers to author their own
privacy policies. Rather, we expect compa-
nies to include them in their general policy-
making process as they do human-readable
Web privacy statements. Developers of sys-
tems such as P3P, which attempt to provide
similar support for privacy management,
share this view.
Controlling access to user
location information: 
A demonstration
To illustrate how our scheme can real-
ize our original scenario, we divide the sce-
nario into six separate interactions.
• Sally’s employer accesses her location
during office hours.
• Sally’s employer accesses her location
outside of office hours but while she is
on call.
• Sally visits a restaurant and lets them
locate her.
• Sally calls a taxi and the taxi company
obtains her location information.
• Sally visits the FunTime amusement park.
• Sally uses a find-a-friend service and
local information providers.
Validators and preferences
Sally’s simple configuration consists of
three validators. The first is a general-pur-
pose validator that uses a configuration
script to determine whether to accept or
decline a request, or to require additional
validators for the decision-making process.
This validator calls the remaining two val-
idators—one to access Sally’s calendar and
the other to determine ownership of physi-
cal spaces—as required. Table 1 gives a rule
base for a general-purpose validator that
would meet Sally’s requirements. Columns
correspond to rules the system uses to allow
access to her location information, and rows
correspond to either parameters to be
matched in the requesting application’s pri-
vacy policy or statements of action to be
taken—for example, to consult an external
validator. Several rows relate to parameters
found in conventional P3P policies as




Policy rule base for a general-purpose validator describing Sally’s preferences.
Parameter Rule 1 Rule 2 Rule 3 Rule 4 Rule 5 Rule 6
Company MyEmployer.com MyEmployer.com * Taxi.com * FindaFriend.com
Organization Commercial Commercial * Commercial Nonprofit,  Commercial
type government
Certification * * * * * *
Request type * * Enumerate * Location,  Colocation
asynchronous
Purpose Safety, information, Safety, information, Safety, information, Service delivery Information Service delivery 
service delivery,  service delivery, service delivery,
statistics, security,  statistics, security, security
other other
Retention * * Stated purpose Stated purpose Stated purpose Stated purpose
Distribution Ours Ours Ours Ours Ours Ours
Initiated * * * Yes * *
Validators None References a  References a None None *
validator that can  verification service
check Sally’s  that checks
calendar ownership of 
physical locations
Location * * * * * *
Time M–F, 9 a.m.–
5 p.m. * * * * *
Anonymity None None Returns a new  None None None
pseudo-identifier
* AnyRules 1 and 2 control Sally’s employer’s
access to her location information. Rule 1
allows the company to obtain any infor-
mation it wants on Sally’s whereabouts
during office hours. Rule 2 supplements
Rule 1 by ensuring that when Rule 1 rejects
a request, the system will use an additional
validator to check Sally’s calendar to see if
she is on call and hence whether to accept
the request.
Rule 3 lets both FunTime and the restau-
rant access Sally’s location. This rule sim-
ply states that Sally’s location can be deter-
mined by anyone who owns the physical
space in which Sally is located. However,
this information is presented in the form
of a pseudo-identifier, thus partially con-
cealing Sally’s true identity.
Rule 4 lets the taxi company get Sally’s
location information when she requests
service. The rule specifies that the taxi com-
pany can only obtain her location infor-
mation if she explicitly requests the service.
Some form of information exchange would
be required to ensure that this condition is
met. Rules 5 and 6 restrict access to Sally’s
location on the basis of company and ser-
vice type and company name and query
type, respectively.
Application privacy policies
Each application that requests Sally’s
location information must also present a
statement of its privacy policy for valida-
tors to check. Figure 2 shows an example
privacy policy for Sally’s employer, and Fig-
ure 3 shows a policy for a local travel infor-
mation service Sally uses. Both policies
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Figure 2. Sally’s employer’s statement of
privacy policy, illustrating indefinite



























Figure 3. Sample policy for a local
information service that operates on a
nonprofit basis and does not retain any of

























</POLICY>contain information specified using the
basic P3P vocabulary and our extensions.
Policies for the other applications take sim-
ilar form.
W
e are currently implement-
ing the system described in
this article as part of our
ongoing research into tech-
nologies to help create deployable perva-
sive systems—that is, systems that can be
deployed outside the confines of the labo-
ratory. We will use this implementation to
support two application-oriented projects.
The first, a series of extensions to the Lan-
caster Guide tourist system,5is designed to
allow individual users to create their own
content for Guide. To explore user reac-
tion to the tension between sharing their
information and protecting their privacy,
we will allow users to choose from a series
of privacy options. The second application-
oriented project, a system for pervasive
health care based on mobile devices and
Grid technologies, will use the privacy sys-
tem to help reassure patients of the privacy
of their medical data. In both cases, we are
interested in how users react to privacy
issues and, in particular, whether our sys-
tem allows users to restrict the dissemina-
tion of their information according to their
wishes.
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